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PACE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
Volume 10 Spring 1993 Number 2
CASENOTE
"Thou Shalt Not Violate!": Emergency
Planning And Community Right-To-
Know Act Authorizes Citizen Suits For
Wholly Past Violations - Atlantic States
Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up
Door Manufacturing Corp.
Matthew J. Smith
I. Introduction
In 1986, Congress passed an amendment to the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA). 1 These amendments became known
as the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of
1986, simply referred to as SARA.2 The legislation contained a
provision known as the Emergency Planning and Community
Right-to-Know Act of 1986 (EPCRA).3 Drafters hoped the
legislation would greatly impact on emergency planning and
1. CERCLA §§ 103-405, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988).
2. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-
9675, 11001-11050 (1988)).
3. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1986), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276, 3374.
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information availability, by providing data on hazardous
chemicals to federal, state and local planners.4 By enacting
EPCRA, Congress intended to achieve two main goals: (1)
provide the public with information on hazardous chemicals
existing within their communities; and (2) establish reporting,
notification and planning requirements which would aid state
and local governments in preparing for and dealing with an
emergency caused by the release of a hazardous chemical.5
The enactment requires that businesses and industries meet-
ing certain criteria6 submit to selected state and federal agen-
cies material safety data sheets,7 hazardous chemical inven-
tory forms,8 and toxic chemical release forms.9 Generally,
most of the information required in the reporting procedures
is available to the public, except for Tier II information sub-
mitted in accordance with section 312.10
After the chemical release accident at Bhopal, India
where more than 2,500 people were killed,11 people throughout
the United States pondered the consequences of such an acci-
dent here, as well as the safety of emergency personnel report-
ing to the scene of such a mishap.12 Local communities pos-
sess great stakes in this controversy, to include: the health of
their citizens living near facilities where a hazardous chemical
is either stored, used or manufactured, and the health of
emergency personnel who could inadvertently stumble upon a
released hazardous chemical in responding to a disaster such
4. S. REP. No. 11, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1985).
5. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, supra note 3, at 281.
6. See generally EPCRA § 302(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 11002(a), (b) (1988) (individ-
ual sections provide additional guidance).
7. EPCRA § 311, 42 U.S.C. § 11021.
8. EPCRA § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022.
9. EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023.
10. EPCRA § 324(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a) (commonly known as the trade secret
provision, limiting access to § 312 Tier II information where the facility owner or
operator has requested the location of any specific chemical be withheld).
11. Jayne S.A. Pritchard, Comment, A Closer Look at Title III of SARA: Emer-
gency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, 6 PACE ENVTL. L. REV.
203 (1988).
12. See, e.g., Karen Heller, Public Outreach: The Stakes are High, CHEMICAL
WK., July 17, 1991, at 81; Ben Phillips, Right to Know: Industry Takes the Offensive,
6 GREATER BATON ROUGE Bus. REP. 30 (1988).
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as a fire or explosion."
Similarly, the stakes for businesses are also high.14 Busi-
ness seeks to operate at the lowest cost possible within the
confines of government regulation to avoid potentially fatal
civil and criminal fines.1 5 Also, business strives to increase
profits while avoiding the public relations damage and civil
liability that follows a release of a hazardous chemical.' 6 To
public interest groups, EPCRA represents a vehicle to enable
them to protect the environment and the public. It also aids
the government by providing additional resources necessary
due to increased roles and responsibilities imposed by legisla-
tion such as EPCRA.
This discussion will provide the reader with a detailed
look at the Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v. Whiting
Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp.17 case, in which EPCRA's
citizen suit provision allowing actions for wholly past viola-
tions recently withstood challenge. Additionally, this casenote
will delve into the legislative history of EPCRA, and provide a
brief overview of some of the act's many requirements. The
discussion closes with an analysis of the possible effects of this
case, as well as possible penalties the court may impose
against a defendant for past violations of EPCRA.
II. Overview of Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp.
This case arises from a citizen enforcement action
brought by Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. (ASLF) of
Syracuse, New York under section 326(a) of EPCRA."8 The
13. See generally Matt Rothman, Closing Ranks in Carbide Country, Bus. WK.,
Apr. 22, 1985, at 28A; Tim Smart et al., Pollution: Trying to Put the Best Face on
Bad News, Bus. WK., July 18, 1988, at 76; Vicky Cahan, Calming Publics Fears: It's
Up to the Chemical Makers, Bus. WK., Aug. 26, 1985, at 33; Michael Wines, Concern
for Safety: After Bhopal - A Lid on Chemicals, L.A. TIMEs, Feb. 6, 1985, pt. 1, at 1.
14. Christine Gorman, Listen Here, Mr. Big!, TIME, July 3, 1989, at 40; Heller,
supra note 12, at 81.
15. See generally Smart et al., supra note 13, at 76; Wines, supra note 13 at 1.
16. See generally Heller, supra note 12, at 81; Gorman, supra note 14, at 40.
17. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772
F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
18. EPCRA § 326(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a).
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citizens group alleges that the defendant Whiting Roll-Up
Door Manufacturing Corp. of Akron, New York violated EP-
CRA's reporting requirements. 9 The plaintiff commenced the
action in the United States District Court for the Western
District of New York."0 ASLF sought the following remedies
in regard to Whiting's alleged violation of EPCRA: declara-
tory judgment on the defendant's liability; civil penalties; and
injunctive relief from further violations." The defendant re-
sponded with a motion for summary judgment under Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) 12(b)(1), 12(b)(6) and 56.
The case focused on one central issue: whether a citizens
group could maintain an action for wholly past statutory vio-
lations despite present compliance. 3
The issues decided in this case are ones of first impres-
sion,2" and under a relatively young piece of legislation that
has little legislative history and case law to support it. A deci-
sion in favor of the defendant would greatly curtail the reach
of the statute and limit its enforcement. On the other hand, a
decision for the plaintiff would greatly impact the regulated
public, since they could be closely monitored by citizens'
groups and penalized for past violations though now in full
compliance. Additionally, there could be indirect impacts such
as increased insurance costs, increased consumer prices (as
manufacturers pass along costs from penalties and compliance
measures), and possibly even adverse effects on the regional
economics (as industry shuts down when unable to meet pen-
alties or compliance costs, leaving people unemployed, reduc-
ing tax rolls and revenues, and reducing demand for other in-
dustrial and consumer products). Several citizen groups have
closely monitored the case, and advocate Atlantic State's ar-
guments. This decision will greatly impact the ability of these
groups to act against ecological villains where government has
failed to act. Notably, Amicus Curiae Memoranda were sub-
19. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 746.
20. Id. at 745.
21. Id. at 746.
22. Id. at 745.
23. Id. at 746.
24. Id. at 749.
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mitted by the Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC),
Environmental Action, Inc., and the Public Interest Research
Group of New Jersey, Inc.2 5
III. Legislative History of EPCRA
The legislative history behind EPCRA, and particularly
its citizen suit provision, can best be described as sparse.
However, the available material sufficiently supports the
court's finding that the plaintiff did have a valid cause of ac-
tion based on past violations.26 An indicative theme continu-
ally resounds throughout the legislative history. The theme
consists of a desire to protect the public by providing valuable
information on hazardous chemicals located in their local
communities, which can be used to formulate emergency
plans."1 The legislators' concerns arise from the aftermath of
the December, 1984 release of a hazardous chemical (methyl
isocynate), which killed more than 2,500 people in Bhopal, In-
dia.28 One of the leading proponents of this legislation vigor-
ously supported EPCRA as a prophylactic for the terrible ills
resulting from chemical releases.29 In the Senate floor debate,
Senator Lautenberg stated:
[One] year ago, Bhopal, India was unknown. Now it is a
name and a place known to people all over the world
.... that strikes terror in the hearts of millions who live
or work near a chemical plant. Since the Bhopal incident,
there have been a series of less serious, but significant,
releases in the United States that suggest that we are far
from immune from such dangers. Clearly, we must take
every step to prevent such occurrences. But, in the event
of a chemical release, we should be better prepared to re-
spond. Hundreds of the victims in Bhopal could have
been spared their lives or injuries if they had known of
25. Id. at 746.
26. Id. at 753.
27. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 14.
28. See generally S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 74; see also Pritchard, supra
note 11, at 204.
29. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 74.
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the hazard around them and known how to respond.
Many more lives could have been saved if a communica-
tion system had been in place to alert residents of Bhopal
about the release. That is true of chemical releases in this
country as well. Our amendment is designed to improve
our ability to respond to these incidents . .. [t]o improve
local emergency preparedness planning.3s
The fear of an accident of the Bhopal magnitude is clearly
evident, and was a distinct catalyst in the legislative process.
EPCRA began as an amendment to the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA)3 The amendment required certain facility owners
or operators to prepare and distribute an inventory of hazard-
ous substances and their characteristics to the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), state/local governments, local
emergency organizations (fire and police) and emergency plan-
ning commissions.32 Legislative history indicates that the term
hazardous substance in EPCRA is borrowed from section 101
(14) of CERCLA,13 and additionally provides that "chemical
mixtures" of one percent or more of a hazardous substance
are to be regulated as well.3 ' Additionally, the Act's history
indicates that compliance would be required of facilities that
had the following characteristics: those which manufactured a
hazardous substance, or stored more than 6,000 kilograms of a
hazardous substance and had more than ten full-time employ-
ees.3 5 EPCRA follows the examples of previous legislation in
New Jersey and Maryland, although primarily mirroring the
New Jersey law.3" The New Jersey legislation was enacted in
30. 131 CONG. REC. S11,664 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 1985) (statements of Sen.
Lautenberg.)
31. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of
1980 (CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9601-9675).
32. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1736-47 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675, 11001-11050 (1988)).
33. CERCLA § 101(14), 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14).
34. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 9.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 10.
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1978, and followed the state's survey of more than 7,000 mem-
bers of the affected industry who contributed comments on
the proposed act.37 Similar to EPCRA, the state legislation re-
quired a business to provide the state/local governments with
an inventory of hazardous substances on their premises.3 8
However, the EPCRA drafters desired to keep the Act (and
any later state regulation) in step with other pre-existing fed-
eral legislation, in order to prevent duplication of effort, pro-
mote national uniformity, and minimize costs to the regulated
public. 9 This idea emerges clearly as the material safety data
sheets (MSDS) (used to inventory hazardous chemicals at a
facility) are governed by the "Hazardous Communication
Standard promulgated under the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 [OSHA],"40 and are meant to "track[ ] re-
quirements which already exist under the OSHA
regulations.""'
A theme of continuity permeates EPCRA's legislative his-
tory as well."' The Act expands the OSHA "employee right to
know" concept establishing a "community right to know" pro-
gram which allows citizens and emergency agencies in areas
where hazardous chemicals are made, used, stored or handled
to have the same access to information as workers do under
the OSHA.4 s The legislative history also evidences a desire
that anytime a facility owner or operator provides hazardous
chemicals to another owner or operator a MSDS must either
be sent before or with the initial shipment of the substance.
The legislative history warns that failure to receive a MSDS
places a burden on the recipient of the hazardous substance to
"make reasonable efforts to contact the manufacturer or im-
porter and request the sheet," and which "must be docu-
mented by . . . retaining copies of correspondence sent or
37. Id; see also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 34:5A-1 to 34:5A-42 (West 1988).
38. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 10.
39. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 59 (1985).
40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
41. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 39, at 112.
42. Id. at 59-60, 111.
43. Id. at 110.
44. Id. at 111.
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records of phone calls made." '45 These requirements reveal an
interconnected transmittal of information not only between
the regulated industry and the public, but also amongst regu-
lated industry as well. This interconnected concept is evi-
denced by EPCRA's requirements being built upon the foun-
dation of OSHA regulations, and stresses the importance of
information flow at all levels and to all concerned parties hav-
ing contact with a hazardous chemical. 6 Additionally, the leg-
islative history of the Act stresses the importance of providing
information to the public. The Senate report on the Act
stresses that "once material safety data sheets are developed,
it is crucial they be made available to the public in the quick-
est, most efficient way possible. 4 7 The Senate conferees la-
mented in the same report that the key purpose of reporting
via the MSDS inventory sheets was to "provide adequate and
timely circulation of the inventory so that those who may be
affected by a release would have access to relevant data con-
cerning the hazardous substance." 8 During debate in the
House of Representatives, Congressman Edgar (a leading ar-
chitect and supporter of the bill) stressed that the public was
entitled to know about exposure to toxic chemicals in their
communities.49 He further added that the EPCRA legislation
provided the public liberal access to toxic chemical informa-
tion, featuring MSDS inventory sheets which were within the
comprehension of an ordinary layman.50 By the above indica-
tions, Congress intended that information on hazardous chem-
icals in one's community be made available to the public as
soon as possible, and in a form easy to understand.5 1 Again,
they hoped this would aid community planning in order to
avoid another disaster of the Bhopal magnitude.2
The final discussion of legislative history deals with civil
45. Id. at 112.
46. Id. at 110-12; see also S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 14.
47. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 39, at 111.
48. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 14.
49. 132 CONG. REc. H9608 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Edgar).
50. Id.
51. Id.; see also S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 14.
52. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 74.
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actions under section 326 of EPCRA. Section 326(a)(1) autho-
rizes citizens to bring suits on their own behalf when facility
owners/operators, the EPA, a state or a state emergency re-
sponse commission fail to comply with EPCRA require-
ments.58 In floor debate, Congressman Swift recognized these
provisions, and also noted one existing limitation which was a
prohibition of suits against local emergency planning commit-
tees. 4 The original House amendment had no provision for
citizen suits.5 The Senate's amendment provided for a citizen
suit provision, which was subsequently modified and refined
in a conference substitute." The substitute embodied the
Senate's provision, but further defined it by eliminating ambi-
guity and adding definition. The conference substitute
added a subsection under section 326 authorizing state and
local governments to bring causes of action for violations of
EPCRA.5 8
Emerging from this brief survey of the Act's limited his-
tory, Congress' intent emerges as a desire to quickly provide
the public information on hazardous chemicals within their
community in order to aid in emergency planning, while keep-
ing the legislation from becoming an undue burden on the
regulated public or out of step with existing federal legisla-
tion. 9 The history supports the desire of timely reporting,
and easy, open access to the public.60 Finally, the history pro-
vides an extremely limited discussion of the section 326 citi-
zen suit provision, having only one limitation - the inability to
sue local emergency planning committees.61 On the subject of
53. EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1); see also 132 CONG. REc. H9593-
94 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Swift).
54. Id.
55. H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. V, at 96-98, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3124, 3219-21.
56. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 119.
57. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 309-10 (1986).
58. Id. at 310.
59. H.R. REP. No. 253, supra note 39, at 59-60, 110-12; see also S. REP. No. 11,
supra note 4, at 14.
60. S. REP. No. 11, supra note 4, at 14.
61. 132 CONG. REC. H9593 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986); see also notes 53-54 and ac-
companying text.
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bringing suits for past violations of EPCRA, the legislative
history remains silent. By failing to mention past violations
amongst the statute's limitations, one could infer that the leg-
islative history supports the interpretation that section 326
authorizes citizens suits for past violations of EPCRA.
IV. Overview of EPCRA
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (EPCRA) can be found under Title III of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA). 62 EP-
CRA has two major themes: (1) the provision of information
to the public on hazardous chemicals within their communi-
ties; and (2) providing information to federal, state and local
governments which can be used in forming emergency policies
and plans regarding the accidental release of a hazardous
chemical.13 EPCRA accomplishes these goals through the use
of three reporting systems." These systems require the facil-
ity owners or operators to submit certain information about
substances termed hazardous chemicals to responsible local,
state and federal authorities. Additionally, Emergency Plan-
ning Committees and Emergency Response Commissions are
established on the local and state levels respectively. 5 These
agencies monitor information submittals as required under
EPCRA, and Local Emergency Planning Committees
(LEPCs) use the information received to develop an emer-
gency plan to deal with the accidental release of a hazardous
chemical.66 The State Emergency Response Commission
(SERC) will review the plan to ensure consistency with plans
of neighboring localities, and make any recommendations as
62. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§
9601-9675, 11001-11050 (1988)).
63. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772
F. Supp. 745, 746 (W.D.N.Y. 1991); see also Pritchard, supra note 11, at 204 (citing
H.R. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3276,
3374).
64. EPCRA §§ 311-313, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021-11023. Applicability to facility own-
ers and operators can be found in individual sections and 40 C.F.R. § 370.1 (1992).
65. EPCRA § 301, 42 U.S.C. § 11001.
66. EPCRA § 303(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11003(a).
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needed.6 7 Additionally, the LEPCs and SERC serve as con-
duits for information, and citizens can contact them in order
to gain knowledge about hazardous chemicals located within
their communities. 8
As mentioned above, three reporting systems drive EP-
CRA. The first comes under section 311, material safety data
sheets (MSDS). 9 Building upon the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 (OSHA)°70 EPCRA asks facility owners
and operators to submit copies of MSDSs for hazardous
chemicals (which the facility owner or operator is required to
have under OSHA) to appropriate LEPCs, SERC, and the lo-
cal fire department.71 A guide for hazardous chemicals for
which a MSDS is required can be found in OSHA's imple-
menting regulations.72 EPCRA provides an option, whereby
the regulated public can submit one compiled list in lieu of
individual MSDSs.73 However, the list must follow OSHA and
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidance and re-
quirements.7 4 The deadline for the submittal of MSDS forms
can be found in section 311(d)(1), and allows for the later of
either: (A) twelve months after October 17, 1986, or (B) three
months after the owner or operator of the facility is required
to prepare such reports under OSHA.75 However, if a facility
owner or operator discovers significant "new information con-
cerning an aspect of a hazardous chemical for which a MSDS
was previously submitted, . . .a revised sheet shall be pro-
vided. ' '76 The statute does not require an annual update. This
information may be made available to the public upon their
request.7 7 Additionally, although an owner or operator may
67. Id.
68. EPCRA §§ 311(c)(2), 312(e)(3), 313(g)(2), 324, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(c)(2),
11022(e)(3), 110 2 3(g)(2), 11024.
69. EPCRA § 311, 42 U.S.C. § 11021; see also 40 C.F.R. § 370.21 (1992).
70. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1988).
71. EPCRA § 311(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
72. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1992).
73. EPCRA § 311(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(1).
74. EPCRA § 311(a)(2)(A), (B), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(2)(A), (B).
75. EPCRA § 311(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(d)(1).
76. EPCRA § 311(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(d)(2).
77. EPCRA §§ 311(c)(2), 324(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(c)(2), 11044(a) (noting that
1993] 1061
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have submitted a list, a LEPC may still require a MSDS for
specific chemicals on the list.
78
The second reporting requirement under EPCRA is the
Emergency and Hazardous Chemical Inventory Form (herein-
after "inventory form").79 Generally, this form must include
all chemicals for which OSHA and section 311 require a,
MSDS. 80 Similar to section 311 requirements, copies of the in-
ventory form must be sent to the appropriate LEPC, SERC
and the local fire department.8 However, EPCRA authorizes
the administrator of the EPA to set "thresholds" for report-
ing.8 2 These thresholds equal quantities of hazardous chemi-
cals below which no facility would be subject to section 312.83
The section breaks down reporting requirements into two
"tiers." Tier I information is the minimum amount of infor-
mation to be reported, and again is in accordance with
OSHA.84 Tier II information reporting is more specific, and
requires various data such as where and in what manner a
hazardous chemical is stored.5 5 The statute's Tier II provi-
sions also allow an opportunity for an owner or operator to
claim a trade secret under section 324 regarding hazardous
chemicals at their facility.88 However, although initial submit-
tal of Tier II information is voluntary, a LEPC, SERC or local
fire department may direct that such information or report be
submitted, for which the regulated public has a mandatory
the only limitation may be as designated under § 322 regarding trade secrets).
78. EPCRA § 311(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(c)(1).
79. EPCRA § 312, 42 U.S.C. § 11022; see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.1, 370.25 (1992)
(EPA regulations on EPCRA).
80. EPCRA § 312(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(1); see also 40 C.F.R. § 370.40 (in-
structions for the completion of the form).
81. EPCRA § 312(a)(1)(A), (B), (C), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(1)(A), (B), (C).
82. EPCRA § 312(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(b); see also 40 C.F.R. § 370.40 (1992)
(EPA regulations providing threshold levels for Tier I and II information under §
312).
83. EPCRA § 312(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(b).
84. EPCRA § 312(d)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(1).
85. EPCRA § 312(d)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(2).
86. EPCRA § 312(d)(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(d)(2)(F); see also EPCRA § 324,
42 U.S.C. § 11044 (which provides that upon a request by an owner or operator under
§ 312, Tier II information should be withheld from public disclosure by the SERC/
LEPC).
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duty to respond." As with section 311, information submitted
is generally available to the public, with public requests even
generating the demand for Tier II information.8 These forms
must be submitted annually by March 1.89 The third main re-
porting requirement is the completion of Toxic Chemical Re-
lease forms.90 Section 313 requires that an owner or operator
complete an EPA form for all toxic chemicals on a list speci-
fied by the EPA.91 This form is commonly known as EPA
Form R.92 This form is an inventory form and applies to facil-
ities which either manufactured, processed or used (in
amounts exceeding section 313(f) threshold limits) toxic
chemicals on the EPA list. 3 Unlike reporting procedures in
sections 311 and 312, section 313 information is only for-
warded to the EPA and a representative from the state gov-
ernment designated by the governor.94 Again, the statute pro-
vides general availability of the information to the public.9 5
EPCRA requires that the "R" form be submitted annually,
and no later than July 1.96
In applying the above sections, the question of whether a
facility is subject to EPCRA regulation differs greatly from
section to section. Section 311 applicability is governed under
OSHA regulations, 7 while section 312 depends on the OSHA
regulations and EPA threshold levels.9 8 However, section 313
reporting is governed by the facility's industrial code and the
amount and type of chemical located at the facility. Addi-
tionally, sections 302 and 303 place the burden on the regu-
87. EPCRA § 312(e)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(1).
88. EPCRA § 312(e)(3)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(e)(3)(B).
89. EPCRA § 312(a)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a)(2); 40 C.F.R. § 370.20 (1992).
90. EPCRA § 313, 42 U.S.C. § 11023; 40 C.F.R. pt. 372 (1992).
91. 40 C.F.R. § 372.65 (1992).
92. Id. § 372.30; see also id. § 372.85 (instructions for completing the form).
93. EPCRA § 313(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a), (b).
94. EPCRA § 313(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a).
95. EPCRA § 324(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a).
96. EPCRA § 313(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a).
97. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (1992).
98. EPCRA § 312(a), (b), 42 U.S.C. § 11022(a), (b).
99. EPCRA § 313(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(b); see also 40 C.F.R. §§ 372.22, 372.25,
372.65 (1992) (regarding types and quantities of chemicals which will subject facility
to coverage).
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lated public to determine whether they fall under the act, and
if so to take actions to notify and coordinate with LEPCs and
SERCs. 100 Failure to comply with EPCRA requirements can
result in action being taken against the owner or operator of a
facility. 101 Action can be taken in the form of an administra-
tive, civil or criminal proceeding.0 2
In regard to violations of reporting requirements, only
civil and administrative penalties can be assessed. 10 3 For fail-
ure to submit Inventory or Toxic Chemical Release Forms,
penalties of up to $25,000 can be assessed per violation.'0 4 For
failure to submit MSDSs, penalties of up to $10,000 can be
assessed per violation. 0 5 The statute adds that each day of
non-compliance equates to a separate violation. 06 Enforce-
ment actions can be brought under section 325 by the EPA.10 7
The statute dictates that both jurisdiction and venue shall be
in the United States district court in which the facility is lo-
cated.' 0 8 However, section 326 provides a remedy for citizen
groups and state and local governments. 0 9 Again, the federal
district court shall have jurisdiction, 01 and venue reposes in
the district where the violation occurred."'
Citizen groups are authorized to bring civil actions
against "an owner or operator of a facility for failure to do any
of the following": to submit an emergency notice (section 304);
to submit a required MSDS/list (section 311); to complete and
submit an inventory form (section 312); and to complete and
submit a toxic chemical release form (section 313).112 Addi-
tionally, citizen suits can be maintained against the EPA, the
100. EPCRA §§ 302, 303, 42 U.S.C. 93 11002, 11003.
101. EPCRA §§ 325, 326, 42 U.S.C. §3 11045, 11046.
102. EPCRA § 325, 42 U.S.C. § 11045.
103. EPCRA § 325(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c).
104. EPCRA § 325(c)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(1).
105. EPCRA § 325(c)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(2).
106. EPCRA § 325(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(3).
107. Id.
108. EPCRA § 325(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(a).
109. EPCRA § 326, 42 U.S.C. § 11046.
110. EPCRA § 326(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c).
111. EPCRA § 326(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b).
112. EPCRA § 326(a)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(A).
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state and a SERC for various reasons to include failure to pro-
vide information required by EPCRA under sections 311-
313.113 State and local governments are authorized to bring
suit "against an owner or operator of a facility for failure to
do any of the following": provide notification to SERCs (sec-
tion 302), submit an MSDS/list, and complete an inventory
form (section 312)." Additionally, the state can sue the EPA
for failure to provide information under section 322.11 SERCs
and LEPCs also possess the right to bring citizen suits against
owners or operators who fail to provide information under
section 303."1
V. The Suit: Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.
Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp.
On October 30, 1990, plaintiff Atlantic States Legal Foun-
dation (ASLF) brought an action against Whiting Roll-Up
Door Manufacturing Corporation in the United States District
Court, Western District of New York for failure to comply
with the reporting requirements of EPCRA.1 7 Based in Syra-
cuse, New York, the plaintiff is a not for-profit group with
nationwide membership, and is "dedicated to protecting and
restoring the natural resources of the United States and its
territories.""' 8 ASLF achieves its goals by promoting public
awareness of man's impact on the environment, and tries to
foster knowledge about the need to live in harmony with the
environment." 9 Mr. Charles M. Tebutt, of the Buffalo law
firm Allen, Lippes & Shonn, represented ASLF. 20 The de-
fendant, Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corporation,
manufactures roll-up and hinged doors, and is located in Ak-
113. EPCRA § 326(a)(1)(B), (C), (D), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1)(B), (C), (D).
114. EPCRA § 326(a)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(2)(A).
115. EPCRA § 326(a)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(2)(C).
116. EPCRA § 326(a)(2)(B), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(2)(B).
117. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772
F. Supp. 745, 749 (W.D.N.Y. 1991).
118. Plaintiff's Complaint at 2, Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp. (No. CIV-90-
1109S).
119. Id.
120. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 745.
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ron, New York.1"' The defendant retained the Buffalo firm of
Hodgen, Russ, Andrews & Goodyear, with Jerrold Brown as
counsel. 2' The court's decision resulted from a motion by the
defendant to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
and failure to state a claim pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6) respectively. ' 3 ASLF initiated its suit pursuant to
the citizen suit provision of section 326(a)(1).'2 4 ASLF sought
the following relief: declaratory judgment on Whiting's liabil-
ity, civil penalties for violations of EPCRA sections 311-313,
permanent injunctive relief prohibiting further EPCRA viola-
tions, and attorney fees and costs.' 5
ASLF alleged that Whiting had violated sections 311-313
between 1987-1989. On May 15, 1990, ASLF sent the Presi-
dent of Whiting a notice of intent to sue, pursuant to section
326(a) of EPCRA.' e After both the EPA and the state failed
to take action, ASLF commenced its civil action. ASLF al-
leged that Whiting violated section 311 of EPCRA by failing
to submit an MSDS for hazardous chemicals including Num-
ber Two fuel oil, gasoline, EPDM compounds, and various
paint mixtures.' 7 The defendant was reported to have vio-
lated this section more than 1,000 times, and failed to come
into compliance until August, 1990.128 In regard to the section
312 violations, Whiting failed to submit inventory forms for
Number Two fuel oil, gasoline, EPDM compounds and paints
containing toluene.'2 9 ASLF claimed that Whiting had failed
to comply until August 21, 1990, and had violated section 312
more than 900 times.' 3 0 Finally, ASLF alleged that Whiting
had violated section 313, when it failed to report and had used
121. Id. at 748.
122. Id. at 745.
123. Id.
124. EPCRA § 326(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a)(1).
125. 772 F. Supp. at 746.
126. EPCRA § 326(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a) (notice to inform defendant of any
allegations to be raised in the suit).
127. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp. (No. CIV-90-
1109S).
128. Id.
129. Id. at 4.
130. Id.
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more than 10,000 pounds per year of the regulated chemical
toluene. ' Under section 313, the Act required the defendant
to submit "R" forms annually, and its non-compliance consti-
tuted over 1,100 violations.1 3 Again, it must be noted that
each day of non-compliance with sections 311-313 constitutes
a separate violation under section 325(c)(3).' 33
Before commencement of the suit, the defendant had
come into compliance.1 34 ASLF admitted this fact at trial.1 35
However, ASLF maintained their action was still valid as EP-
CRA authorized suit for wholly past violations.136 Although
Whiting had come into compliance, it had not done so by the
mandatory dates embodied in each of the sections, resulting
in violations. 37 ASLF maintained that these violations were
actionable under section 326(a) authorizing citizen suits
against owners or operators of a facility "for failure to do"
specified EPCRA reporting requirements.1 38 However, the de-
fendant's interpretation was a stark contrast. The defendant
claimed that as of the date of the suit's commencement there
was no failure to comply with EPCRA, as it had submitted
the required reports.1 39 By complying and submitting its
forms late, Whiting proffered there was no violation.1 40 To
support its argument, the defendant relied on Gwaltney of
Smithfield v. Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc.,"' which in-
terpreted the Clean Water Act's (CWA) citizen suit provi-
sion"" regarding wholly past violations.1 43 The Supreme Courtheld that CWA section 505(a) did not authorize citizen suits
131. Id. at 5.
132. Id. at 6.
133. EPCRA § 325(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(3).
134. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 746.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 750.
138. Id. at 748.
139. Id. at 746.
140. Id. at 750.
141. 484 U.S. 49 (1987).
142. CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (1988).
143. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 751-52.
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for wholly past violations.1 4 4 The relevant provision of CWA
section 505 provides that "any citizen may commence a civil
action on his own behalf. . . against any person .. .who is
alleged to be in violation of (A) an effluent standard or limita-
tion . .. [or] (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a
State." 145 The Gwaltney court examined the statutes' plain
language, statutory scheme, and legislative history, and found
that the language "alleged . . . to be in violation," although
ambiguous, referred to a continuing or intermittent viola-
tion.1 46 To further bolster its interpretation, the Gwaltney
court stated that the sixty day notice provision147 was pro-
vided to offer the opportunity for the defendant to come into
compliance and avoid litigation. 148
In support of the ASLF's argument, an Amici Curiae
memorandum was submitted from the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Environmental Action, Inc., and Public Interest
Research Group of New Jersey, Inc.1" 9 In the memorandum,
the Amici attacked Whiting's interpretation of EPCRA sec-
tion 326(a) and stated "that this interpretation would en-
courage companies to avoid or delay their compliance with the
law, thereby adversely affecting Amici's members and the
public at large.''50 The memorandum also stressed that Con-
gress' intent was for prompt and timely submission of re-
quired documents, and the defendant's interpretation severely
undermined that goal.' Regarding civil penalties, the Amici
stated that violators would be deterred if they knew that fines
would be imposed for failing to file on time.152 They rejected
defendant's interpretation as encouraging companies "to do
nothing until they are notified that a citizen suit is imminent
144. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 59-61.
145. CWA § 505(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1).
146. Gwaltney of Smithfield, 484 U.S. at 57.
147. CWA § 505(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). But cf. EPCRA § 326(d), 42 U.S.C. §
11046(d) (EPCRA's 60 day notice requirement).
148. 484 U.S. at 60.
149. Memorandum of Amici Curiae, Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Whit-
ing Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. CIV-90-1109S).
150. Id. at 3.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 4.
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and then to hastily file their forms before a citizen suit is
brought.
153
Next the Amici questioned Whiting's reliance on
Gwaltney. They directed attention to language of both EP-
CRA and the CWA, noting the former authorized citizen suits
"for failure" to comply with the statute while the latter fo-
cused on "persons alleged to be in violation.' 154 Additionally,
they highlighted other textual constructions such as CWA's
repeated use of "occurs" and "occurring," compared with EP-
CRA's authorization of venue in the district where the viola-
tion "occurred. 55 Additionally, the Amici discussed the
Gwaltney court's interpretation of the sixty day notice provi-
sion. The Amici stated that Congress amended the Clean Air
Act (CAA) 5 to allow citizen suits for wholly past violations as
a response to dissatisfaction with Gwaltney.157 Although the
citizen suit provision was amended, the sixty day notice re-
quirement remained unchanged. Noting this, the Amici rea-
soned that the provision's impact on suits (past or present)
depended on which statute was involved, and that there was
no universal interpretation of such a provision. 58 The Amici
stated the sixty days notice provisions served three purposes:
(1) to give the alleged violator notice and enable him to verify
or contest the citizen's allegations; (2) encourage a violator to
mitigate its violations by taking corrective actions; and (3) en-
able parties to discuss the alleged violation and negotiate a
settlement.1 59 The memorandum concluded with a discussion
on penalties, and included as an exhibit the EPA's "Enforce-
ment Response Policy for Section 313 of the Emergency Plan-
ning and Community Right-to-Know Act."' 60 In its analysis,
the Amici described EPA's policy as utilizing penalties to de-
153. Id.
154. Id. at 6.
155. Id. at 7. Compare CWA § 505(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. 1365(c)(1) with EPCRA §
326(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b).
156. CAA § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (Supp. II 1990).
157. Memorandum of Amici Curiae at 7-8, Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp.
(No. CIV-90-1109S).
158. Id. at 8.
159. Id. at 10-11.
160. Id. at 17.
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ter violations of section 313, and that penalties were appropri-
ate for iionreporting.I' They also noted that the most strin-
gent penalties recommended by the policy matrix were for
nonreporting; the very offense which Whiting committed." 2
After reviewing all relevant submittals, the Amici Memo-
randum, and hearing oral arguments on March 19, 1991, the
district court rendered a decision on the defendant's motion.
The court looked initially to the Act's legislative history, and
finding no legislative intent to the contrary, was compelled to
rely on the plain language of the statute.'63 Utilizing the plain
language of the statute, the court found that the mandatory
compliance dates in EPCRA sections 311-313 were require-
ments for purposes of the citizen suit penalty provision under
EPCRA section 325.164 The court stressed that Congress'
choice of the word "shall" in sections 311-313 was indicative
of an EPCRA requirement of mandatory compliance by a
specified date. 65 Regarding the defendant's argument that the
statute only governed present violations, the court held the
interpretation was "far too restrictive. . . for according to the
statute's plain language, the compliance .dates constitute re-
quirements of the reporting provisions; the unequivocal lan-
guage of sections 311-313 requires initial reporting on dates
certain."166 Additionally, the court reasoned that the defend-
ant's interpretation was not consistent with section 325(c)'67
authorizing penalties against "[a]ny person .. .who violates
any requirement. . ." of EPCRA's reporting provision. 6 8
Next, the court proceeded to discuss the objective of the
act through its requirements and legislative history. The court
determined that the Act had two objectives: (1) provide the.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 18.
163. Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. at 750 (citing Consumer
Products Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102 (1980) (holding absent a
clearly expressed legislative intent to the contrary a court must use a statute's plain
meaning)).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. EPCRA § 326(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c).
168. 772 F. Supp. at 750.
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public information on hazardous chemicals in the local com-
munities; and (2) provide information which can be used to
develop emergency plans to respond to an accidental release
of a hazardous chemical.16 9 The court added the burden was
on Whiting to comply with the reporting requirements, and
failure to do so severely derails attempts to develop emer-
gency plans. 170 Emergency plans are formulated on informa-
tion submitted. Either the failure to report or late reporting
can cause incomplete plans to be formulated, which endanger
the public and emergency workers. Likewise, the defendant's
interpretation "would render gratuitous the compliance
dates," and provide the public no recourse against violators
who endanger the safety of the community. 7 1
Finally, the court analyzed Whiting's reliance on
Gwaltney. Immediately, it recognized that EPCRA and the
CWA's citizen suit provisions differ in language.7 2 The court
noted that the CWA authorized a citizen suit against persons
"alleged to be in violation,"1 73 while EPCRA authorized suits
against those for "failure to" comply.' 7' The court then rea-
soned that from a "natural reading" one could interpret EP-
CRA to include past acts of non-compliance, and the CWA as
only pertaining to present or continuing acts. 75 They also
found that the language of section 326(b)(1),17 6 which pro-
vided venue in the district court where the "alleged violation
occurred," to be an indicator of congressional intent. 77
In reference to the sixty day notice argument of
Gwaltney, the court made strong reference to the recent
amendment of the CAA. It stressed that Congress had specifi-
cally amended the CAA to provide for citizen suits on wholly
-past violations, yet allowed the sixty day notice provision to
169. Id. at 751.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 750.
172. Id. at 752.
173. CWA § 505(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a).
174. EPCRA § 326(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(a).
175. 772 F. Supp. at 752.
176. EPCRA § 326(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(b)(1).
177. 772 F. Supp. at 753.
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remain untouched. 1 8 The court reasoned that if the notice
provision had the same purpose in the CAA as it did in
Gwaltney, Congress would not have allowed such a contradic-
tion to exist.17 9
Based upon the above analysis, the court held that ASLF
was authorized under EPCRA to bring a civil suit for past vio-
lations of a reporting requirement, despite the defendant's
current compliance. The court then denied the defendant's
motion to dismiss the complaint pursuant to FRCP 12(b)(1).
To date, the case remains unsettled, and pending further judi-
cial action.180
As this is a case of first impression, there are no previous
cases on point which can be cited for support. However, ASLF
has commenced twelve other similar actions.18' In June 1991,
ASLF commenced a suit against Frink America, Inc., a manu-
facturer of snow plows in Clayton, New York.1"2 ASLF alleged
that Frink violated EPCRA by failing to submit a Toxic
Chemical Release Inventory Report Form R for quantities of
xylene it had at its facility.'8 3 Subsequently, the case reached
settlement in July, 1991 when a consent decree was entered. 84
In the agreement, the defendant agreed to: comply with EP-
CRA sections 311-313, pay a fine of $51,000 for failure to
timely report under section 313 ($43,000 of which allowed for
a credit to Frink to undertake and implement a pollution pre-
vention/toxins reduction program), and pay ASLF's legal
fees. 1 5
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Telephone Interview with Docket Clerk, United States District Court, West-
ern District of New York (Mar. 22, 1993). Despite this fact, the Whiting decision is a
viable one and has been applied by a federal district court in California in arriving at
a similar conclusion. See Williams v. Leybold Technologies, 784 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1992) (holding liability and fines can be assessed for past violations of EPCRA
despite current compliance).
181. Telephone Interview with Charles M. Tebutt, Counsel for ASLF, of the law
firm Allan, Lippes & Shonn (Feb. 18, 1992).
182. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Frink America, Inc., No. 91-CV-0734
(N.D.N.Y. June 26, 1991).
183. Plaintiffs Complaint at 3, 4, Frink America, Inc. (No. 91-CV-0734).
184. Consent Decree, Frink America, Inc. (No. 91-CV-0734) (July 8, 1991).
185. Id. at 3-5.
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Similarly, ASLF commenced two other suits which were
settled in a comparable fashion. In March, 1991, a suit was
commenced against Cooper Industries Turbocompressor Divi-
sion of Buffalo, New York.186 The action alleged that Cooper
violated EPCRA sections 311-313, and notably had significant
quantities of trichloroethane and xylene present at its facil-
ity.187 ASLF aimed its other action at Bennet Manufacturing
of Alden, New York, which is a manufacturer of sheet metal
products, nuts, bolts, rivets, and washers. 8 8 ASLF claimed
that Bennet violated EPCRA section 313 by failing to submit
an "R" form for the chemical xylene that was present at its
facility in amounts over the threshold level. 89 Both cases set-
tled by order of consent decree within thirty days of
commencement. 9 '
ASLF also initiated a suit against the Buffalo Envelope
Company during the same time period the Whiting action was
brought.'9 ' The suit greatly mirrored Whiting to include the
parties arguments and the court's reasoning. In a similar fash-
ion, the court again held for ASLF, 92 noting "the defendant's
[Buffalo Envelope Co.] interpretation ignores [EPCRA] sec-
tion 313's plain language."' 93 An identical Amici Curiae Mem-
orandum was submitted, 94 and likewise the defendant relied
heavily upon the Gwaltney decision. 95 Again, the court easily
distinguished the case from Gwaltney based on the plain lan-
guage and legislative purpose of the Act.'96 However, ASLF
186. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Cooper Indus. Turbocompressor Div.,
No. CIV-91-0157A (W.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 12, 1991).
187. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3-5, Cooper Indus. Turbocompressor Div. (No.
CIV-91-0157A).
188. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Bennet Mfg. Co., No. CIV-91-0114A
(W.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 12, 1991).
189. Plaintiff's Complaint at 3, Bennet Mfg. Co. (No. CIV-91-0114A).
190. Telephone Interview with Susan Kellog, Clerk, United States District
Court, Western District of New York (Jan. 24, 1992).
191. Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v. Buffalo Envelope Co., No. CIV-90-
lll0S, 1991 U.S. Dist. WL 183772 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1991).
192. Id. at *7.
193. Id. at *5.
194. Id. at *2.
195. Id. at *5-7.
196. Id. at *5.
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added an additional charge against Buffalo Envelope; viola-
tion of EPCRA section 304(c) 9 7 for failing to submit a follow-
up emergency notice.' 98 Despite the denial of Buffalo Envel-
ope's motion to dismiss, the case remains unsettled on its re-
maining issues. 199
As seen above, Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing
Corp. is part of a concerted plan to enforce EPCRA compli-
ance throughout the area of northern New York state. The
plan's goal focused on the detection of violators, with such
parties being reported to the United States Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) for action; and in the event of gov-
ernment inaction to face a citizen suit for non-compliance
with EPCRA.20 0 The information leading to the detection of
violators was compiled by ASLF utilizing volunteers who
spent months scouring New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation (DEC) files.20' In the cases surveyed,
the majority of violators have subsequently complied with
EPCRA's reporting requirements, and entered consent de-
crees with ASLF. Of the thirteen actions brought by ASLF in
northern New York, ten violators have entered into consent
decrees, one is currently negotiating a settlement and two
have chosen litigation.0 2 Additionally of the ten violators who
settled, six agreed to initiate pollution prevention programs,
while the remaining four chose to endure higher penalties.0 3
The Whiting and Buffalo Envelope Co. cases stand as an
example to other industries in the area, who may now have to
think twice regarding non-compliance and resisting a citizen
suit if caught. These cases and ASLF's actions currently pro-
vide a model for concerned groups in other states to follow. 20'
ASLF's counsel, Charles M. Tebutt, is currently involved in
similar EPCRA litigation in the Eastern District of Michigan,
197. EPCRA § 304(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(c).
198. Buffalo Envelope Co., 1991 U.S. Dist. WL 183772, at *3.
199. Telephone Interview with Susan Kellog, supra note 180.
200. Telephone Interview with Charles M. Tebutt, supra note 181.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
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where the Ecology Center of Ann Arbor is battling Johnson
Controls.0 5 In Wisconsin and Minnesota, Citizens for a Better
Environment have commenced similar EPCRA actions.08 En-
vironmental Action has instituted actions in Virginia as
well.207 Thus, we are currently observing the birth of a larger
movement, which will have nationwide impact.
VI. Affect of the Decision
The Whiting decision will have significant impact on EP-
CRA enforcement. Today, we live in a period characterized by
economic uncertainty and decreasing fiscal ability of federal,
state, and local governments to deal with the plethora of en-
forcement responsibilities delegated to them by various legis-
lation. The Whiting Roll-Up Door decision helps fill the gap
in needed enforcement in light of government funding con-
straints. By allowing citizen groups to bring actions and be
subsequently reimbursed for legal fees,208 meager government
assets are supplemented by private "citizen attorney gener-
als." This acts as a catalyst to develop better cooperation be-
tween the public and government, as well as to ensure the de-
velopment of more accurate emergency plans.
To industry, it encourages the concept of proactive com-
pliance. As seen above, ASLF did not target businesses that
filed late. ASLF pursued businesses that had not filed any re-
quired section 311-313 reports. Thus, a business seeking to
avoid exposure to potentially substantial fines 209 and exten-
sive legal costs would opt for compliance. It must be noted
that late filing is considered an admission of a violation, and
could subject a business to EPA or state penalties (still much
less than fines imposed after being caught for non-compli-
ance). However, one drawback may be greatly increased court
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id.
208. EPCRA § 326(f), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(f) (allowing court costs to prevailing
parties in civil litigation under this section).
209. EPCRA § 325(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c) (penalties of up to $25,000 for §§
312-313 violations, and up to $10,000 fine for § 311 violations).
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dockets as citizens bring more suits, because now citizens may
even bring suit against the EPA, states, or SERCs for failing
to fulfill a duty under EPCRA 10
To the average member of the general public, the decision
also impacts their lives, although it may be indirect. It pro-
vides a greater opportunity to participate in government,
through enforcement of a statute. It helps aid public safety in
providing greater and more accurate information for emer-
gency planning. Along the same lines, increased information
helps protect emergency workers (many times volunteers in
most sections of the United States) from unknown chemical
exposure and hazards. The citizen is also able to find out what
is going on in his community, and is able to express himself if
he finds a wrong. Additionally, businesses must become aware
of not only employee safety, but also the safety of nearby resi-
dents and emergency workers who might be affected by an-
other Bhopal type disaster. 11
In regard to the effect on business, many operational and
liability cost issues emerge. Regardless of whether an organi-
zation is in compliance, past violations are actionable, and can
be costly. Substantial fines under EPCRA sections 325-326,212
multiplied by the fact that each day of non-compliance
equates to a separate violation, 13 further drive the fear of EP-
CRA's penalties. Additionally, violators earn reputations as a
"Public Enemy" in the local community where the impact is
greatest and may arouse bitter resentment. This could result
in strong protests and picketing of facilities, or boycotts
against the manufacturer's products."1 Many businesses will
find it is better to comply now than face staggering fines later
after becoming the target of a citizens group's action.2 15 How-
ever, even compliance adds costs due to the requirements en-
210. EPCRA § 326(a)(1)(B), (C), (D), 42 U.S.C. § 11046 (a)(1)(B), (C), (D).
211. Phillips, supra note 12, at 30 (stating that businesses must now look beyond
their gates and at local resident's safety, as they are now becoming members of the
community).
212. EPCRA §§ 325, 326, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11045, 11046.
213. EPCRA § 325(c)(3), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c)(3).
214. Gorman, supra note 14, at 40.
215. See generally Heller, supra note 12, at 81.
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tailed, coupled with any administrative penalties EPA may
levy for late submission.21 All aspects considered, the regu-
lated public will discover compliance as the easier and more
cost effective route.
VII. Possible Penalties Courts May Impose
In regard to violations of reporting requirements of EP-
CRA, courts have a limited but powerful arsenal. The statute
provides no criminal penalty for violation of reporting re-
quirements. However, civil penalties and injunctive relief are
authorized.1 7 Civil penalties can be quite substantial, and as
previously stated each day of noncompliance is a separate vio-
lation.21 8 Additionally, the court using its injunctive power can
order compliance or shutdown a defendant's operation.
When imposing a judgment, the court walks a virtual
"tightrope." Many dangers exist from too severe an imposi-
tion. Excessive fines could lead to the closing of a facility, and
loss of jobs.219 This job loss creates a "domino" effect of indi-
rect negative results. Workers unable to find work migrate to
other geographic areas or request government assistance (e.g.:
unemployment or social services assistance). Unemployed
workers seldom have money to spare, affecting the retail and
service segments of the local economy. The government tax
base, now trying to deal with an influx of unemployed workers
requiring assistance, experiences a shrinkage of its tax reve-
nue from one less industry in the tax base and declining sales
tax revenue as consumers spend less.220 The danger magnifies
when the plant closure occurs in a rural, one industry area.221
Contrary, too light an imposition also provides negative
216. See, e.g., Smart et al., supra note 13, at 77 (describing where one small
company with net sales of $10 million annually spent more than $12,000 and lost an
employee's efforts for an entire month to complete the required reports).
217. EPCRA §§ 325(c), 326(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11045(c), 11046(c).
218. EPCRA § 325(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11045(c).
219. See, e.g., Rothman, supra note 13, at 28A.
220. Id. (noting that the chemical industry provides approximately 20% of the
taxes in Kanawha County, W. Va., and in one of the county's towns, Union Carbide
employs 7,000 of the 16,000 residents).
221. Id.
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side effects. Its failure to provide deterrence to businesses can
even prolong continued non-compliance as some may find it
cheaper to violate EPCRA.222 Consequently, an erosion begins
in the public's trust of the court's enforcement and EPCRA's
protection. Adversely, public participation decreases, while
the threat from hazardous chemicals and incomplete emer-
gency planning increases.
When considering a penalty imposition, the court must
consider many factors. In United States v. Hooker Chemical
& Plastics Corp.,2 3 a state sought $250 million in punitive
damages arising from common-law public nuisance claims
which were a result of Hooker Chemical's actions at the infa-
mous "Love Canal. '22 4 In assessing punitive damages, the
court stressed that factors to be considered included deter-
rence, relation to harm done, and flagrancy of the conduct.225
The court added that punitive damages were not set by any
"rigid formula" and "need bear no ratio to compensatory
damages." 226
Another source for penalty guidance reposits in the
EPA's "Enforcement Response Policy for Section 313 of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act. 227
The policy states the purpose of penalties is to ensure en-
forcement, provide deterrence, and foster proactive business
compliance with EPCRA.228 In assessing a penalty, the EPA
provides specific guidance. The policy provides a penalty ma-
trix, which contains a horizontal and vertical axis specifying
penalty amounts.229 The vertical axis takes into account the
seriousness of the violation, the quantity of chemicals in-
volved, and the size of the corporate entity (measured by the
222. Memorandum of Amici Curiae at 19, Atlantic States Legal Found., Inc. v.
Whiting Roll-Up Door Mfg. Corp., 772 F. Supp. 745 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (No. CIV-90-
1109S).
223. 748 F. Supp. 67 (W.D.N.Y. 1990).
224. Id. at 68.
225. Id. at 77.
226. Id. (citing Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Village of Hempstead, 422
N.Y.S.2d 47, 53 n.15 (1979)).
227. Memorandum of the Amici Curiae, supra note 149, Exhibit E.
228. Id. at 1, 4 (Exhibit E).
229. Id. at 9 (Exhibit E).
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net sales and amount of employees).2 30 The horizontal axis
takes into account culpability, history of prior violations, abil-
ity to continue in business, and other factors as justice may
* 23require. 31 Penalties suggested range from a mere $200 per vi-
olation to a statutory maximum of $25,000 per violation.2 32 It
should be noted that this policy applies only to EPCRA sec-
tion 313 violations. Finally, the policy provides guidance on
out of court settlements, by emphasizing flexibility and discre-
tion.2 3 It stipulates that no set percentage exists for penalty
reductions, but penalties should be reduced on a case-by-case
basis in accordance with substantive reasons, such as defend-
ant's cooperation and mitigation efforts.2 34
As previously stated, the court imposition of a judgment
can be critical to our national economy on a regional basis and
our efforts to safeguard the environment. Thus, courts must
take many factors into consideration when pondering a pen-
alty for an EPCRA violation, and also must not overlook both
direct and indirect effects. Although penalties are meant to
enforce EPCRA and punish violators, imposition must not be
rigid, and must provide flexibility for mitigating circum-
stances. The EPA's policy provides many key factors to con-
sider, which in essence reflects the views expressed in the
Hooker Chemical & Plastics Corp. case. 23 5 Due to the tradi-
tional deference given to administrative agencies by the courts
because of their expertise, a court should carefully review and
consider the EPA's policy when imposing fines for violations
of EPCRA reporting requirements.
VIII. Conclusion
The decision reached in Atlantic States Legal Founda-
tion, Inc. v. Whiting Roll-Up Door Manufacturing Corp. will
greatly enhance and buttress EPCRA's utility and enforce-
230. Id. at 7 (Exhibit E).
231. Id.
232. Id. at 9 (Exhibit E).
233. Id. at 17 (Exhibit E).
234. Id.
235. 748 F. Supp. at 67.
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ment. Although greatly affecting business, the value from the
decision greatly exceeds costs as measured by the prevention
of another Bhopal level accident. While the decision only
touched EPCRA in a narrow fashion on limited provisions of
EPCRA, it provides a valuable resource for the public and
business. For the public, it chronicles another triumph in the
struggle to make our environment safe, and illustrates another
vehicle for citizen action. For the regulated public, it sends a
warning, and in utilizing the references contained in this arti-
cle provides a source from which a business can travel toward
compliance. Although the decision may be ultimately over-
turned if an appeal is taken, the case now stands as a mile-
stone in the evolution of EPCRA enforcement.
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